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WE THE EXCEPTIONAL 
AMERICAN PEOPLE 
James E. Fleming* 
[The People of America] reared the fabrics of governments 
which have no model on the face of the globe. 
The Federalist No. 141 
I. INTRODUCTION: "AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM" 
There is an academic movement afoot-one with a long his-
torical pedigree-to attribute the vitality of the American consti-
tutional order to "American exceptionalism." The most 
prominent representative of this school of thought is Bruce Ack-
erman, whose We the People opens with a jeremiad against the 
"Europeanization" of American constitutional theory and urges 
us as Americans to "look inward" to rediscover our distinctive 
patterns, practices, and ideals.z He maps the terrain of theory as 
being divided into monists ("Anglophiles"), rights foundational-
ists ("Germanophiles"), and dualists (red-blooded Americans).3 
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1. The Federalist No. 14, at 104 (James Madison) (Ointon Rossiter ed., New Amer-
ican Library, 1961). 
2. Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 3-6, 32-33 (Belknap Press, 1991) 
("We the People"). 
3. Id. at 6-16, 32-33, 35-36. Monism emphasizes popular sovereignty over and 
against fundamental rights, and thus tends to equate popular sovereignty with parliamen-
tary supremacy on a British model. Id. at 7-10,35. Rights foundationalism challenges the 
primacy of popular sovereignty, stressing constraints imposed by deeper commitments to 
fundamental rights on a German model. Id. at 10-12, 35-36. Ackerman presents dualism 
as an "accommodation" between monism and rights foundationalism. Id. at 12-13. Dual-
ism distinguishes between the constituent power of We the People, expressed in the 
higher law of the Constitution, and the ordinary power of officers of government, ex-
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Only dualists have the "strength" to declare our American inde-
pendence from British and German models and philosophers.4 
Thus, as Sanford Levinson observes, Ackerman is reopening the 
question about "American exceptionalism" from Europe.s 
Ackerman published We the People in 1991, during the bi-
centennial celebration of the ratification of the Bill of Rights. 
Accordingly, it is tempting to dismiss his rhetoric of American 
exceptionalism as little more than patriotic flag-waving. But his 
argument that the American Constitution is dualist rather than 
rights foundationalist depends importantly upon a contrast that 
he draws between the American Constitution and the German 
Basic Law with respect to entrenchment of constitutional provi-
sions against subsequent amendment.6 I shall assess this argu-
pressed in the ordinary law of legislation. Dualism preserves, against encroachment by 
ordinary law, the fundamental rights ordained and established by We the People in the 
higher law of the Constitution; to that extent, it is like rights foundationalism. But it 
preserves only those fundamental rights; beyond them, it is like monism in deferring to 
ordinary law. ld. at 12-13, 32-33. 
There are problems with Ackerman's map of the terrain of American constitutional 
theory. For purposes of this Article, I shall put to one side the difficulties with his distinc-
tion between monism and dualism, and I shall accept his distinction between dualism and 
rights foundationalism. Elsewhere, I have suggested that one can be a dualist in a general 
sense without being committed to dualism in Ackerman's specific sense-that is, without 
endorsing his complex apparatus of higher lawmaking through structural amendments to 
the Constitution outside the formal Article V amending procedures, and without ac-
cepting his purported distinction between dualism and rights foundationalism on the 
ground that the former theory but not the latter rejects the idea that a duly ratified 
amendment might be unconstitutional. See James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substan-
tive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211, W n.380, 290 n.405 (1993). Furthermore, I have 
outlined a constitutional constructivism, id. at 217-20, 280-304, a theory that is neither as 
positivist as Ackerman's own theory of dualism nor as naturalist as his portrayal of rights 
foundationalism. 
4. Ackerman, We the People at 3 (cited in note 2). 
5. Sanford Levinson, blurb on dust jacket of We the People. See also Sanford Lev-
inson, Accounting for Constitutional Change, 8 Const. Comm. 409, 429 (1991) (character-
izing Ackerman's enterprise as "the most important and imaginative work now being 
done in the area of constitutional theory"). If Ackerman's We the People reopens the 
tradition of "American exceptionalism," perhaps his The Future of Liberal Revolution 
continues the tradition of American imperialism, attempting to colonize Eastern Euro-
pean countries (not to mention South Africa and Latin American countries) with Ameri-
can models and theories. See Bruce Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution (Yale 
U. Press, 1992). Both works are thus in different ways characteristically American. Ack-
erman places himself in the tradition of American exceptionalism epitomized by Louis 
Hartz, stating: "I share with Louis Hartz an abiding skepticism about the power of Euro-
pean models to enlighten American politics without fundamental conceptual reorganiza-
tion." Ackerman, We the People at 25 (cited in note 2) (referring to Louis Hartz, The 
Liberal Tradition in America (Harcourt, Brace, 1955)). 
6. Ackerman, We the People at 13-16 (cited in note 2). Ackerman also discusses 
the German Basic Law in his treatment of liberal revolution. See Ackerman, The Future 
of Liberal Revolution at 101-12 (cited in note 5). In the aftermath of the unification of 
West Germany and East Germany, I shall speak simply of the "German Basic Law." For 
an analysis applying Ackerman's constitutional theory to constitutional issues raised by 
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ment, asking to what extent his contrast illuminates differences 
between the American and German constitutional orders and ad-
judicates the conflicting claims of dualism and rights foundation-
alism to be the better account of the American scheme of 
government. My conclusion is that, although the American 
"fabrics of governments" may well be exceptional, Ackerman 
has not established his case for dualism over rights 
foundationalism. 
II. OUR ALIENABLE DUALIST CONSTITUTION? 
Ackerman argues that the American Constitution is dualist 
rather than rights foundationalist. Dualists conceive the Consti-
tution as "democratic first, rights-protecting second" in the sense 
that judicial protection of constitutional rights against encroach-
ments by the ordinary law of legislation "depend[s] on a prior 
democratic affirmation on the higher lawmaking track" of the 
Constitution.7 Rights foundationalists "reverse this priority," for 
they hold that "the Constitution is first concerned with protecting 
rights; only then does it authorize the People to work their will 
on other matters. "s 
German unification, see Paul Schwartz, Social Discourse and Constitutional Change: The 
Example of German Reunification (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
author). 
7. Ackerman, We the People at 13 (cited in note 2). Thus, Ackerman's theory of 
dualism seeks to reconstruct the classical, interpretive justification of judicial review, put 
forward in The Federalist No. 78 at 467, 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (cited in note 1), and 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803): Courts are obligated to inter-
pret the higher law of the Constitution and to preserve it against encroachments by the 
ordinary law of legislation. See Ackerman, We the People at 60-61, 72 (cited in note 2). 
In this Article, I shall not assess his distinctions between ordinary lawmaking and higher 
lawmaking, or between "normal politics" on the former track and "constitutional politics" 
on the latter track. Id. at 230-94. For discussions of these matters, see, e.g., Suzanna 
Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 918 (1992) (reviewing Ackerman, 
We the People (cited in note 2)); Terrance Sandalow, Abstract Democracy: A Review of 
Ackerman's We the People, 9 Const. Comm. 309 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, The 
Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 Const. Comm. 115 (1994). See also Symposium on 
Bruce Ackerman's We the People, 104 Ethics 446 (1994). 
8. Ackerman, We the People at 13 (cited in note 2). For an argument that Acker-
man's formulation presents a "false dichotomy" because both democracy and rights, or 
popular sovereignty and unalienable rights, are constitutive principles of our constitu-
tional democracy, see Samuel Freeman, Original Meaning, Democratic Interpretation, and 
the Constitution, 21 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3, 41-42 (1992). For a similar argument, though not 
directed specifically against Ackerman, that our constitutional order is a hybrid scheme of 
democracy (majority rule) and constitutionalism (limited government), or constitutional 
democracy, see, e.g., Walter F. Murphy, James E. Fleming, and William F. Harris II, 
American Constitutional Interpretation 23-46 (Foundation Press, 1986); Walter F. Murphy, 
Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, in Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., Con-
stitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World 3, 3-7 (Oxford U. 
Press, 1993) ("Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy"). 
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Ackerman's argument for dualism over rights foundational-
ism emphasizes a contrast between the American Constitution 
and the German Basic Law concerning entrenchment. Our Con-
stitution, he observes, "has never (with two exceptions ... ) ex-
plicitly entrenched existing higher law against subsequent 
amendment by the People. "9 The two exceptions are Article V's 
prohibition of amendments (1) affecting the African slave trade 
until 1808 and (2) depriving a state of equal representation in the 
Senate without its consent. The Basic Law, by contrast, "explic-
itly declared that a long list of fundamental human rights cannot 
constitutionally be revised, regardless of the extent to which a 
majority of Germans support repeal."lo Article 79(3) entrenched 
unalienable human rights to dignity, the fundamental principles 
of free democratic basic order, and the basic structure of 
federalism.11 
Ackerman submits that practices regarding entrenchment 
provide an important crucible for testing whether a constitutional 
order is dualist or rights foundationalist.12 He contends that the 
absence of "German-style entrenchment" of fundamental rights 
in the American Constitution-and thus their repeatability or 
alienability-is an "embarrassment" for rights foundationalists 
but not for dualists.13 He also states that our constitutional expe-
rience with entrenchment, through the two exceptions involving 
slavery and federalism, has been "very negative" and has not 
9. Ackerman, We the People at 13 (cited in note 2). 
10. ld. at 15 (emphasis in original). 
11. Article 79(3) of the German Basic Law provides in relevant part: "Amendments 
of this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Laender, the participation 
on principle of the Laender in legislation, or the basic principles laid down in Articles 1 
and 20, shall be inadmissible." Articles 1 and 20 relate to the protection of unalienable 
human rights to dignity and the free democratic basic order, specifically, the right to resist 
any person or persons seeking to abolish the constitutional order, a democratic and social 
federal state. For a translation of portions of The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, see Walter F. Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus eds., Comparative Constitutional 
Law: Cases and Commentaries (St. Martin's Press, 1977) ("Comparative Constitutional 
Law"). For analyses of the constitutional theory of the Basic Law, and of its entrench-
ment of certain basic principles against subsequent amendment, see, e.g., John E. Finn, 
Constitutions in Crisis: Political Vwlence and the Rule of Law 185-91 (Oxford U. Press, 
1991) ("Constitutions in Crisis"); Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence 
of the Federal Republic of Germany 36-39, 52-55 (Duke U. Press, 1989); Walter F. Mur-
phy, Excluding Political Parties: Problems for Democratic and Constitutional Theory, in 
Paul Kirchhof and Donald P. Kommers eds., Germany and Its Basic Law 173, 173-78 
(Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993) ("Excluding Political Parties"). 
12. Ackerman, We the People at 13 (cited in note 2). 
13. Id. at 14. See also Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Polilics/Constitutional Law, 
99 Yale L.J. 453, 469 (1989) (using the stronger formulation "a very great 
embarrassment"). 
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served the cause of human freedom.14 From these aspects of our 
constitutional document and history, he concludes that rights 
foundationalism "is inconsistent with the existing premises of the 
American higher lawmaking system."ts For in America, "it is the 
People who are the source of rights,"t6 and We the People are 
not bound by a higher law than the higher law of the Constitu-
tion.17 In the crucible of entrenchment, Ackerman argues, ours 
proves to be an alienable dualist Constitution, unlike the unalien-
able rights foundationalist Basic Law. 
Should we be persuaded by Ackerman's argument for dual-
ism from his contrast between the American Constitution and 
the German Basic Law? Are practices of entrenchment a good 
crucible in which to test the basic commitments of a constitu-
tional order? Or is Ackerman's test rigged in favor of a positivist 
dualism? 
Early British legal positivists like John Austin believed that, 
to get to the bottom of a legal system, one had to find a sover-
eign, "a legally untrammelled will" behind the legislature that 
was free, "not only from legal limitations imposed ab extra, but 
also from its own prior legislation."ts Sophisticated contempo-
rary positivists like H.L.A. Hart have argued instead that the 
foundation of a legal system is an accepted rule of recognition 
specifying the ultimate criteria of legal validity.19 Ackerman has 
stated that his aim in constitutional theory is to develop a "prin-
cipled positivism" in the form of a theory of dualist democracy 
that would provide "principles of recognition" of higher lawmak-
ing (by analogy to Hart's idea of rules of recognition).2o Under 
14. Ackerman, We the People at 15 (cited in note 2) (referring to entrenchment of 
African slave trade until 1808). See also id. at 326 n.21 (referring to entrenchment of 
equal representation of each state in the Senate and claiming that "[t]his effort to en-
trench federalism caused all sorts of trouble in the aftermath of the Civil War"). 
15. Id. at 15. 
16. Id. 
17. In using formulations like that in the text ("We the People are not bound by a 
higher law") or in the title ("We the Exceptional American People"), I do not intend to 
personify the constituent power, that is, to confiate the citizenry (the people) with the 
constituent power (We the People). For a sophisticated treatment of the difference be-
tween the "Constitutional People" and the "sovereign constitution-making people," see 
William F. Harris, II, The Interpretable Constitution 201-04 (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 
1993). 
18. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 145 (Clarendon Press, 1961) (analyzing John 
Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (H.L.A. Hart ed., Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, 1954) (1832)). See also id. at 70-76 (analyzing the positivist idea of "The Sov-
ereign behind the Legislature"). 
19. Id. at 97-107. 
20. Bruce Ackerman, Remarks at New York University School of Law Colloquium 
on Constitutional Theory, Nov. 16, 1993 (colloquy between Ackerman and Ronald 
Dworkin). 
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Ackerman's positivist theory of popular sovereignty, We the Peo-
ple are free, not only from limitations imposed ab extra by 
unalienable rights, but also from our own prior higher 
lawmaking.21 
With this background in mind, we should ask whether the 
fact that our Constitution lacks entrenchment clauses of the sort 
expressed in the German Basic Law proves, as Ackerman main-
tains, that it is dualist rather than rights foundationalist. In an-
swering this question, we should consider the strong likelihood 
that an unrelenting positivist dualist applying Ackerman's cruci-
ble of entrenchment would contend that the German Basic Law, 
like the American Constitution, is ultimately dualist. According 
to such a positivist, Article 79(3) of the Basic Law would not, in 
Hart's terms, put a stop to the chain of inquiries concerning legal 
validity;zz she or he would insist on pressing further to find the 
legally untrammelled will or sovereign standing behind the en-
trenchment clauses. (The proof of this speculation lies in Acker-
man's suggestion that the Basic Law may have an "escape hatch" 
(Article 146) through which German dualists might prevail over 
German rights foundationalists by repealing the limitations of 
Article 79(3) and thereby modifying the Basic Law's foundation-
alist commitments.z3) From the standpoint of such a positivist 
dualism, entrenchment clauses in a written constitution are-to 
quote Chief Justice John Marshall from an analogous context-
"absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power, in 
its own nature illimitable. "24 
21. Ackerman, We the People at 13-16 (cited in note 2). 
22. See Hart, The Concept of Law at 104 (cited in note 18). 
23. Ackerman, We the People at 326 n.20 (cited in note 2). Ackerman observes that 
the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), in Article 146, allows for its replacement by a completely 
new Constitution (Verfassung). ld. He writes: "Since the drafters of the Basic Law took 
this step to emphasize the provisional character of West Germany [pending reunification 
with East Germany], and not the provisional character of fundamental rights, it would be 
a great abuse of art. 146 to use the occasion of a new Verfassung to modify the entrenched 
provisions on human rights." Id. He concludes: "Nonetheless, this technical possibility 
does provide an escape hatch through which German dualists might conceivably modify 
their Basic Law's foundationalist commitments." ld. 
Originally, Article 146 provided: "This Basic Law shall cease to be in force on the 
day on which a constitution adopted by a free decision of the German people comes into 
force." Murphy and Tanenhaus, Comparative Constitutional Law at 22-23 (cited in note 
11). As it turned out, the Basic Law was not replaced by a completely new Constitution 
during the process of reunification of West Germany and East Germany. For constitu-
tional analyses of German reunification, see Peter E. Quint, The Constitutional Law of 
German Unification, 50 Md. L. Rev. 475 (1991); Schwartz, SociJJI Discourse and Constitu-
tional Change: The Example of German Reunification (cited in note 6). 
24. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). In the quoted passage, 
Chief Justice Marshall is not discussing entrenchment clauses, but instead is advancing the 
1994] AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 361 
Furthermore, even a rights foundationalist could admit, as 
John Rawls writes, that "in the long run a strong majority of the 
electorate can eventually make the constitution conform to its 
political will."zs But, Rawls continues: "This is simply a fact 
about political power as such. There is no way around this fact, 
not even by entrenchment clauses that try to fix permanently the 
basic democratic guarantees."26 This fact about political power, 
however, is not the foundation of legitimacy in either the Ameri-
can or the German constitutional order.27 Nor does it prove that, 
at bottom, our Constitution is dualist rather than rights founda-
tionalist. Ackerman's crucible of entrenchment is a rigged posi-
tivist test. 
If practices of entrenchment do not tell us whether we have 
a dualist or a rights foundationalist constitutional order, can they 
tell us anything? One way to explore this matter is to ask what 
the purposes of entrenchment are. Let us posit a positivist-less 
relentless than the one we just imagined-who believes that if 
you want to know the constitutive principles on which a constitu-
tional order is founded (and nothing else), you must look at it as 
an entrenchment formalist, and examine what provisions are ex-
plicitly entrenched in the constitutional document against subse-
quent amendmentzs Applying this test, the positivist would 
conclude from Article 79(3) of the German Basic Law that the 
classical, interpretive justification of judicial review under a written constitution. See 
supra note 7. 
25. John Rawls, Political Liberalism 233 (Colum. U. Press, 1993). 
26. Id. See also Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. Cal. 
L. Rev. 703,757 (1980) (conceding that "[a]s a matter of sheer power, the people can give 
themselves a new constitutional order" by repudiating a constitutional document's pro· 
tection of unalienable human rights to dignity, but contending that the terms of the cur-
rent constitutional document "cannot supply legitimate procedures" for destroying the 
old constitutional order and creating a new one); Walter F. Murphy, Merlin's Memory: 
The Past and Future Imperfect of the Once and Future Polity, in Sanford Levinson ed., 
Responding to Imperfection (Princeton U. Press, forthcoming 1995) ("Merlin's Memory") 
(discussing the issue of the extent to which "the people can bind themselves"). 
27. I do not mean to deny that one could attempt to provide a justification for a 
constitutional theory of popular sovereignty or positivist dualism like Ackerman's on the 
basis of a normative political theory. Ackerman, however, has not elaborated such foun-
dations for his constitutional theory, notwithstanding his title (We the People: Founda-
tions). Indeed, Ackerman has stated-in terms of Ronald Dworkin's formulation of the 
two dimensions of best interpretation, fit and justification, see Ronald Dworkin, Law's 
Empire 239 (Belknap Press, 1986); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 107 (Harv. 
U. Press, 1977)-that "fit is everything." Remarks at New York University School of 
Law Colloquium on Constitutional Theory, Nov. 16, 1993 (colloquy between Ackerman 
and Dworkin). For suggestions that Ackerman's theory at bottom is a form of authorita-
rianism or formalism, see infra note 59. 
28. Cf. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in Collected Legal Papers 167, 
171 (Peter Smith, 1952) ("If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at 
it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge 
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constitutive principles of the German scheme of government 
were unalienable human rights to dignity, the fundamental prin-
ciples of free democratic basic order, and the basic structure of 
federalism. But such a positivist would find Article V of the 
American Constitution cryptic (or deeply unjust) on first sight: 
for entrenchment of protection of the African slave trade until 
1808 and equal representation of the states in the Senate hardly 
look like constitutive principles of a constitutional order.29 This 
discovery might lead to either of two conclusions: that the Amer-
ican Constitution simply recognizes no fundamental rights as 
constitutive principles, or that in our constitutional document en-
trenchment performs a role other than that of securing constitu-
tive principles. Ackerman basically draws the former conclusion; 
I shall pursue the latter. 
What alternative role might Article V entrenchment play in 
the American Constitution? Perhaps Article V entrenches provi-
sions that reflect deep compromises with our Consitution's con-
stitutive principles: the protection of the African slave trade with 
the principle that all persons are created equal, and the equal 
representation of the states in the Senate with the principle of the 
equal representation of citizens.3o The founders of the Constitu-
tion concluded that both compromises were necessary to "the 
forging of the Union": the slave states insisted upon the former, 
the small states upon the latter.Jl Thus, both imperfections were 
considered necessary "to form a more perfect Union" than the 
enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether 
inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience"). 
29. On one interpretation, which I offer below, these provisos in Article V en-
trenched compromises with our constitutive principles. See infra text accompanying 
notes 30-33. On another interpretation, which underscores the injustice of the original 
Constitution, these provisos entrenched two of our constitutive principles: the fundamen-
tal right of slave holders to property in slaves and structural protections of states' rights. 
John Finn suggested the latter interpretation to me (without endorsing it). 
30. For a suggestion that both the protection of slavery in the original Constitution 
and the provision for equal representation of each state in the Senate-the two matters 
that Article V entrenched against amendment-are inconsistent with the principles of 
"democratic reason" or "constitutional democracy," see Freeman, 21 Phil. & Pub. Aff. at 
35 (cited in note 8). 
31. See Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the Union: 1781-1789, at 281-87 (Harper 
& Row, 1987). See also Richard B. Bernstein (with Jerome Agel), Amending America: If 
We Love the Constitution So Much, Why Do We Keep Trying to Change It? 20-22 (Times 
Books, 1993). Akhil Amar has observed that Article V's proviso regarding the equal rep-
resentation of states in the Senate was not itself part of the famous "Connecticut Com-
promise" between the small and large states, noting that the proviso "was not even 
mentioned until the penultimate day of the convention, and was voted on with virtually 
no discussion or analysis of its implications." Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: 
Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043, 1070-71 n.97 
(1988). 
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Articles of Confederation. From this standpoint, contra Acker-
man, we can see that Article V entrenched features of the Con-
stitution that were vulnerable to being repealed through 
democratic procedures, precisely because they manifested such 
deep compromises with our constitutive principles and ordained 
such an imperfect Constitution. 
With this idea of the purpose of entrenchment on hand, we 
should reassess Ackerman's contrast between American and 
German practices. Ackerman may make such haste to disparage 
the American experience with "German-style entrenchment," 
and to taint it by association with slavery, that he overlooks this 
alternative purpose of bolstering vulnerable features of a scheme 
of government. Moreover, his discussion obscures a deeper simi-
larity: both the American and German founders expressly en-
trenched provisions of their new constitutional orders that they 
considered necessary to secure the transition to a more perfect 
union. Again, in making the transition from the Articles of Con-
federation to the Constitution, the small states insisted upon 
equal representation in the Senate, and the slave states upon pro-
tection of the African slave trade. In the aftermath of the fail-
ures of the Weimar Constitution and the atrocities of Nazism, the 
founders of the Federal Republic of Germany insisted upon en-
trenching certain unalienable human rights and structural princi-
ples that had been outrageously disregarded during the Nazi 
regime.J2 
The further point is that both countries expressly entrenched 
the features of their new constitutional orders that were feared to 
be in greatest need of bolstering, and at greatest risk of repeal 
through democratic procedures, given their historical circum-
stances. As it happens, the American Constitution explicitly en-
trenched provisions that deeply compromised its founding 
principles, while the German Basic Law explicitly entrenched 
provisions that profoundly expressed its reconstruction princi-
ples.JJ We should not, however, let this contrast concerning en-
32. See, e.g., Finn, Constitutions in Crisis at 179-93 (cited in note 11); Kommers, The 
Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany at 36-39, 52-55 (cited in 
note 11). 
33. Ackerman might concede this point yet still contend that it cuts in favor of dual-
ism that the American founders did not entrench unalienable rights. One response is that 
they did, for example, in the Preamble, the First Amendment, the Ninth Amendment, the 
Declaration of Independence, and the structural implications of the constitutional order. 
See, e.g., Harris, The Interpretable Constitution at 164-68, 191-201 (cited in note 17) (ana-
lyzing "the limits of textual amendability" and "a hierarchy of amendment sequences" 
that distinguishes between the limits on amendability through Article V and the greater 
revisability of the polity through Article VII); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the 
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trenchment clauses obscure similarities between the constitutive 
principles of the two constitutional orders. 
In drawing this misleadingly strong contrast between the 
American and German constitutional schemes, and urging 
Americans to "look inward" to rediscover their distinctive dualist 
Constitution, does Ackerman seriously mean to imply that the 
idea of unalienable rights is alien to American constitutional the-
ory, or that Americans have gotten this idea from looking out-
ward to German models and philosophers? To the contrary, the 
idea of unalienable rights is far more congenial to the American 
constitutional tradition than to the German. For one thing, Brit-
ish legal positivists from Bentham to Hart have characterized 
American jurisprudence as marked by an anti-positivist emphasis 
on unalienable rights.34 For another, the German Basic Law's 
explicit entrenchment of unalienable rights was a "forceful rejec-
Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 457, 504-05 
(1994) (emphasizing the Declaration of Independence, the Preamble, and the logic of a 
system of republican self-government in suggesting that "not everything is properly 
amendable," for certain higher law principles, including popular sovereignty and perhaps 
liberty of conscience, frame Article V itself); Amar, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1044-45 n.1 
(cited in note 31) (arguing that "the First Amendment may itself be a seemingly paradoxi-
cal exception to the general rule that amendments must not be unamendable"); Walter F. 
Murphy, The Art of Constitutional Interpretation: A Preliminary Showing, in M. Judd Har-
mon ed., Essays on the Constitution of the United States 130, 150-51 (Kennikat Press, 
1978) (suggesting that the First Amendment may be an "unamendable constitutional pro-
vision"); Jeff Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 Yale 
L.J. 1073, 1084-89 (1991) (arguing that there are natural rights limitations on the amend-
ing power, derived from the history and structure of the Constitution as a whole, that are 
expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the Ninth Amendment). Below, I 
shall raise the possibility of a theory of implicit or "structural entrenchments" of funda-
mental rights as distinguished from explicit entrenchments of them in Article V. See infra 
text accompanying notes 66-73. 
Another response is that the American founders did not need explicitly to entrench 
unalienable rights. See, e.g., Freeman, 21 Phil. & Pub. Aff. at 41 (cited in note 8). Here, I 
shall emphasize the latter response. It is well to recall that the original Constitution did 
not include a Bill of Rights, much Jess an entrenched one. As Hamilton wrote in The 
Federalist No. 84, "the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful 
purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS." The Federalist No. 84 at 515 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(cited in note 1). The arguments in favor of adopting a Bill of Rights ultimately prevailed, 
but against this background perhaps it would have been too much to ask for an en-
trenched Bill of Rights. Moreover, in the historical circumstances surrounding the Amer-
ican founding, as contrasted with those surrounding the German reconstruction, explicit 
entrenchment of unalienable rights would have been unnecessary. 
34. See H.L.A. Hart, 1776-1976: Law in the Perspective of Philosophy, in H.L.A. 
Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 145, 145-52 (Clarendon Press, 1983) (dis-
cussing Bentham's famous attack on the Declaration of Independence); H.L.A. Hart, The 
United States of America, in H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham 53, 53-65 (Clarendon Press, 
1982) (same); see also H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The 
Nightmare and the Noble Dream, in H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 
123, 123-25, 132-42, supra (discussing American jurisprudence's anti-positivist concentra-
tion on rights and moral principles in the judicial decisionmaking process). 
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tion of the legal positivism that grounded individual liberties in 
Weimar, where such rights found their source in the authority of 
the state."3s 
The reconstruction of constitutional democracy in Germany, 
upon "reflection and choice,"36 was rooted not only in a rejection 
of Weimar constitutional theory and Nazism, but also in an ac-
ceptance of American constitutional theory and practice. After 
World War II, the American "fabrics of governments" served as 
a "model on the face of the globe."37 The German Basic Law 
(not to mention the Japanese Constitution) was in no small mea-
sure made in America.3B To some extent, therefore, when Ameri-
cans look outward to the German Basic Law, they look into a 
mirror of their own unalienable rights and constitutive principles. 
In other words, to a degree the unwritten American Constitution 
is written into the German Basic Law, and the unalienable rights 
and constitutive principles underlying the American constitu-
tional order are expressly entrenched in the German constitu-
tional document.39 
35. Finn, Constitutions in Crisis at 188 (cited in note 11). See also Kommers, The 
Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany at 37-38 (cited in note 
11). 
36. Finn, Constitutions in Crisis at 179 (cited in note 11) (quoting The Federalist No. 
1 at 33 {Alexander Hamilton) (cited in note 1)). 
37. The Federalist No. 14 at 104 (James Madison) (cited in note 1). 
38. I do not mean to overstate this point-for example, by implying that Americans 
actively participated in the drafting of the German Basic Law, that the American influ-
ence upon it was the only influence, or that the German Basic Law (and the Constitu-
tional Court's interpretation of it) do not carry some "American" ideas further than the 
American Constitution, tradition, and practice have taken them. I simply mean to em-
phasize that the influence of American ideas upon the Basic Law was considerable, and 
that the contrast between these two constitutional orders is not as great as Ackerman's 
analysis suggests. Walter Murphy has written: "Not only did Britain, France, and the 
United States set the basic guidelines for the new order [the German Basic Law], but 
their military governors were also frequent, if seldom effective, kibitzers in the drafting 
process." Murphy, Excluding Political Parties at 173 (cited in note 11). (He also has ob-
served that the Japanese document was known for several decades as "the MacArthur 
Constitution." Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy at 22 n.27 (cited 
in note 8).) For discussions of the impact of American ideas on the German Basic Law, 
see, e.g., Peter H. Merkl, The Origin of the West German Republic (Oxford U. Press, 
1963); John Ford Golay, The Founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (V. of Chi. 
Press, 1958). 
39. See Murphy, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 751-53 (cited in note 26). Nonetheless, there 
are important differences between the American Constitution and the German Basic 
Law, most notably with respect to the latter's provisions regarding duties and responsibili-
ties in addition to rights. See Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal 
Republic of Germany at 36-37,41-42,56 (cited in note 11); Murphy, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 
753 (cited in note 26). See also Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of 
Political Discourse 61-75 {The Free Press, 1991) {observing differences between the 
American conception of the person as a "lone rights-bearer" and the German image of 
the person as having not only rights but also responsibilities and duties to others); but see 
Linda C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility, 43 Duke L.J. 989 (1994) (criticizing Glen-
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In conclusion, the fact that the American Constitution, un-
like the German Basic Law, does not explicitly entrench unalien-
able rights or constitutive principles does not prove that it is 
dualist, or "democratic first, rights-protecting second." Contrary 
to Ackerman's claim, the absence of provisions entrenching fun-
damental rights in the American Constitution is not an "embar-
rassment" for rights foundationalists.40 To paraphrase the Ninth 
Amendment: the entrenchment in the Constitution, of certain 
compromises, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
unalienable rights retained by the people.4t Ackerman has failed 
to establish his claim that our "American exceptionalism" con-
sists in the fact that we have an alienable dualist Constitution. 
III. OUR IMPERFECT DUALIST CONSTITUTION? 
Ackerman further argues that the general availability of re-
peal of fundamental rights protected in the American Constitu-
tion is an "embarrassment" for rights foundationalists but not for 
dualists.42 He contends that our Constitution, again unlike the 
German Basic Law, is open to "morally disastrous" amendments 
repealing fundamental rights.43 To test this contention, Acker-
man conjures up two hypothetical Christianity amendments. The 
first establishes Christianity as the state religion of the American 
people, thereby repealing the fundamental right to liberty of con-
science. The second forbids repeal of the first, thereby en-
trenching it and in effect repealing freedom of speech and dualist 
democracy itself.44 Ackerman states that dualists would accept 
these amendments as valid while rights foundationalists would 
reject them as unconstitutional. Asserting that in America, un-
like Germany, "almost all lawyers" would consider "absurd" or 
"preposterous" the idea that an amendment to the Constitution 
don's account of the relationship between rights and responsibilities in American 
jurisprudence). 
40. See Freeman, 21 Phil. & Pub. Aff. at 41-42 (cited in note 8) (quoting Ackerman, 
99 Yale L.J. at 468, 469 (cited in note 13)) (arguing, contra Ackerman, that substantive 
fundamental rights such as liberty of conscience, along with procedural democratic rights 
like the right to vote, are constitutive of and inalienable in our constitutional democracy). 
41. A caveat is in order here. I am drawing an analogy by paraphrasing the Ninth 
Amendment, not offering an interpretation of that provision. The controversies sur-
rounding the interpretation of the Ninth Amendment are beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, ed., 1 The Rights Retained by the People (George Mason 
U. Press, 1989); Randy E. Barnett, ed., 2 The Rights Retained by the People (George 
Mason U. Press, 1993); Symposium on Interpreting the Ninth Amendment, 64 Chi.-Kent L. 
Rev. 1 (Randy E. Barnett, ed., 1988}. 
42. Ackerman, We the People at 14 (cited in note 2). 
43. ld. at 14-15. 
44. ld. at 14-15 & 15-16 n. 
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might be unconstitutional, Ackerman claims that dualism better 
fits our constitutional order than does rights foundationalism.45 
Having drawn this contrast through these two hypothetical 
amendments, Ackerman goes on to confess that, as a citizen and 
a political philosopher, he is a rights foundationalist who would 
be proud to be a member of the generation that "finally re-
deem[ ed] the promise of the Declaration of Independence by en-
trenching inalienable rights into our Constitution," including 
liberty of conscience and freedom of speech.46 We should recall 
that his earlier writings include Social Justice in the Liberal 
State,47 a work of rights foundationalist political philosophy that 
bears affinities to the liberal political philosophies of John Rawls 
and Ronald Dworkin, from whom he now wishes to distance 
himself as a dualist constitutional theorist.4s Michael Klarman 
has suggested that Ackerman's confession that he yearns to 
move "beyond dualism" to a rights foundationalist constitutional 
order evinces a "glaring contradiction" that undermines his com-
mitment to popular sovereignty and raises the question "why one 
should take seriously Ackerman's detailed exegesis of dualist 
democracy." 49 
Whether or not he falls into contradiction, Ackerman is 
straining mightily to prove his democratic and positivist mettle by 
proclaiming that he would uphold the validity of these hypotheti-
cal amendments as a dualist constitutional theorist, though he 
45. ld. at 15 & 15 n. Ackerman states: "I doubt, moreover, that one may find many 
American lawyers who seriously disagree-even among those who presently wrap them-
selves up in foundationalist rhetoric." ld. at 14-15. He does, however, mention Walter 
Murphy as "a constitutionalist who may have the courage of his foundationalist convic-
tions." See Ackerman, 99 Yale L.J. at 470 n.28 (cited in note 13) (citing Walter F. Mur-
phy, Slaughter-House, Civil Rights, and the Limits on Constitutional Change, 32 Am. J. 
Juris. 1 (1987)). For analyses of the German constitutional order and judicial practice in 
this respect, see, e.g., Murphy, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 754-57 (cited in note 26) (discussing 
The Southwest Case, 1 BVerfGE 14 (1951)); Finn, Constitutions in Crisis at 186 (cited in 
note 11) (same). See also supra note 33 (citing arguments that the American Constitution 
entrenches certain unalienable rights against repeal). 
46. Ackerman, We the People at 321 (cited in note 2). See also id. at 16. 
47. Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (Yale U. Press, 1980). 
48. Ackerman, We the People at 11 (cited in note 2) (referring to John Rawls, Kant-
ian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. Phil. 515 (1980); Dworkin, Taking Rights Seri-
ously (cited in note 27); and Dworkin, Law's Empire (cited in note 27)). But see id. at 30, 
327-28 n.49 (noting that his own work in political philosophy builds on the liberal tradi-
tion that includes Rawls); Bruce Ackerman, Political Liberalisms, 91 J. Phil. 364 (1994) 
(criticizing Rawls, Political Liberalism (cited in note 25), while also acknowledging simi-
larities between Rawls's political philosophy and his own). 
49. Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of 
Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 759, 763-64 n.37 
(1992). Ackerman presumably would contend that there is no "glaring contradiction" be-
tween being a dualist constitutional theorist and being a rights foundationalist political 
philosopher. See Ackerman, We the People at 16, 319-22 (cited in note 2). 
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would hold them "morally disastrous" as a rights foundationalist 
political philosopher. With all the zeal of a born-again positivist 
who has seen the errors of his rights foundationalist past, Acker-
man kneels before the altar of Henry Monaghan's "Imperfect 
Constitution,"so striving to show that his constitutional theory 
passes what Christopher Eisgruber has dubbed Monaghan's "no 
pain, no claim" test.sl (Basically, the idea is that a constitutional 
theory has no serious claim on our attention unless the theorist 
putting it forward suffers some pain by acknowledging that the 
Constitution does not secure everything that she or he would 
protect in a perfect Constitution.sz) Indeed, Ackerman does 
more than confess his past as a rights foundationalist, for he also 
admits his present temptation to move beyond dualism to rights 
foundationalism and to entrench a new Bill of Rights against sub-
sequent amendment.s3 Yet he maintains that he does not suc-
cumb, proving his democratic and positivist virtue by unveiling 
his imperfect dualist Constitution.s4 
Through this argument for dualism from the two hypotheti-
cal Christianity amendments, Ackerman is attempting to deliver 
a coup de grace against rights foundationalists of the sort that 
would be made by Article V positivists like Robert Bork.ss Their 
50. See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 395 
(1981). 
51. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice and the Text: Rethinking the Constitutional 
Relation Between Principle and Prudence, 43 Duke L.J. 1, 7 (1993) (referring to 
Monaghan, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 (cited in note 50)). But liberal rights foundationalists 
should not despair. On the evidence of Ackerman's We the People, they should rest as-
sured that his constitutional theory will legitimate almost anything that they believe the 
Constitution protects, although in the name of We the People, not unalienable fundamen-
tal rights. See also Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317 
(1992). 
52. For the idea of a "Constitution-perfecting" theory, as distinguished from a "pro-
cess-perfecting" theory, see Fleming, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (cited in note 3) (advancing a 
Constitution-perfecting theory of judicial review of ordinary lawmaking without taking up 
the issue of judicial review of higher lawmaking). I mean "perfecting" in the sense of 
interpreting the Constitution with integrity so as to render it as a coherent whole, not in 
Monaghan's caricatured sense of "Our Perfect Constitution" as a perfect liberal utopia or 
an "ideal object" of political morality. See Monaghan, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 356 (cited in 
note 50). Cf. Frank I. Michelman, Constancy to an Ideal Object, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 406-07 
(1981) (distinguishing "weak-sense perfectionism" or "constitutional rationalism" from 
"strong-sense perfectionism"). For the idea of amendments to the Constitution as re-
sponding to imperfection, see Sanford Levinson, ed., Responding to Imperfection 
(Princeton U. Press, forthcoming 1995). 
53. Ackerman, We the People at 16, 319-22 (cited in note 2). For the notion of 
"temptation," see Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of 
the Law (The Free Press, 1990) ("The Tempting of America"). 
54. Ackerman, We the People at 15-16 (cited in note 2). 
55. See Bork, The Tempting of America (cited in note 53). (For Bork's discussion of 
Ackerman's theory, see id. at 214-16; for Ackerman's critique of Bork's theory, see Bruce 
Ackerman, Robert Bork's Grand Inquisition, 99 Yale L.J. 1419 (1990) (reviewing Bork, 
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last move, in trying to place the American Constitution in the 
camp of popular sovereignty rather than unalienable fundamen-
tal rights, would be to assert that under the amending procedures 
of Article V, We the People have ultimate constitutional author-
ity to "alter any feature of the [constitutional] document includ-
ing its commitment to basic liberties and constitutional forms."s6 
Now, this type of move is to be expected from an Article V 
positivist like Bork. But such a move is, to say the least, surpris-
ing coming from Ackerman. After all, he has spent the last dec-
ade developing a complex theory of amending the Constitution 
outside Article V through structural amendments.s7 Yet here we 
find Ackerman talking like an Article V positivist with respect to 
repealability and entrenchment. In this essay, I can only briefly 
state three points in response. 
The first point concerns Ackerman's evident strategy for 
winning acceptance of his complex constitutional theory among 
lawyers. He assumes that lawyers are low-level positivists who 
would reject out of hand rights foundationalist theories that pre-
suppose that unalienable rights or constitutive principles are im-
plicitly entrenched in the constitutional order (outside Article 
V), though not explicitly entrenched in the constitutional docu-
ment (in Article V). Ackerman's tack is apparently to join such 
positivist lawyers and then to try to enlist them-through an ap-
peal to lawyerly criteria of fit with our constitutional document 
and underlying constitutional order-on the side of dualism and 
against rights foundationalism.ss The strategy is basically if you 
can't beat the positivist lawyers, join them, and then hope that 
they will join you. I mean to intimate shades of Suzanna Sherry's 
supra)). For discussion of the sort of coup de grace to be expected from someone with 
commitments like Bork's, see Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and 
Community in Liberal Constitutionalism 182 (Oxford U. Press, 1990) ("Liberal Virtues"). 
56. Macedo, Liberal Virtues at 182 (cited in note 55). 
57. See, e.g., Ackerman, We the People at 266-94 (cited in note 2); Bruce A. Acker-
man, Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale LJ. 1013, 1051-57 (1984); Ackerman, 99 Yale 
L.J. at 486-515 (cited in note 13). Ackerman is not the only constitutional theorist who 
rejects the exclusivity of Article V's formal amending procedures. See also Amar, 55 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1043 (cited in note 31); Amar, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 457 (cited in note 33). 
58. See, e.g., Ackerman, We the People at 15, 15 n. (cited in note 2) (appealing to 
what "almost all lawyers" would think was "absurd" or "preposterous"). In remarks at 
the New York University School of Law Colloquium on Constitutional Theory, Novem-
ber 16, 1993, Ackerman made repeated recourse to "lawyerly criteria of fit," which he 
linked to his concern in his writings for "the possibility of interpretation." See, e.g., Ack-
erman, We the People at 131-62 (cited in note 2); Ackerman, 93 Yale LJ. at 1070-72 (cited 
in note 57); Ackerman, 99 Yale L.J. at 515-45 (cited in note 13). 
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interpretation of Ackerman's dualism, in the guise of a liberal 
originalism, as "the ghost of liberalism past."s9 
Strategically, Ackerman would be prudent to ponder the 
great likelihood that positivist lawyers who would join him in re-
jecting rights foundationalist ideas of implicit entrenchment of 
constitutive principles or unalienable rights outside Article V as 
absurd or preposterous would also stand ready to join positivists 
like Bork in rejecting as preposterous and absurd Ackerman's 
own idea of amendment of the Constitution outside Article V. 
That is, lawyers who are Article V positivists regarding entrench-
ment are also quite likely to be Article V positivists concerning 
amendment. They are usually the sort of people who contend 
that the words of Article V "mean what they say"60 or that the 
whole point of Article V is to have a "clear rule of recognition 
for constitutional change. "6t In short, such positivist lawyers-
Ackerman's new-found allies-probably would use Article Vas 
a coup de grace against his own theory of structural amendments. 
Ironically, notwithstanding Ackerman's attempt to portray him-
self as a positivist,62 the positivists are the persons who are least 
likely to be persuaded by his theory. 
My second point is that Ackerman himself, despite his best 
efforts, does not sound like an Article V positivist when discuss-
ing the two hypothetical Christianity amendments. For example, 
he does not say simply that the hypothetical amendment repeal-
ing liberty of conscience is valid, because it has been ratified 
through Article V procedures. Instead, he concedes that it would 
inaugurate a "deep transformation" of our Constitution: "on 
more or less the same order, though of a very different kind," as 
the transformations to new "regimes" within dualist democracy 
achieved by the Reconstruction Republicans and New Deal 
Democrats.63 Nor does Ackerman say simply that the hypotheti-
cal amendment entrenching such a repeal is valid, because the 
59. See Sherry, 105 Harv. L. Rev. at 933-34 (1992) (cited in note 7) (suggesting that 
Ackerman's "originalism" reveals "the sad state of American liberalism" and that 
"[t]here is genuine pathos in seeing what was once the most optimistic and forward-look-
ing of the American political philosophies reduced in this appeal to the authority of the 
past"). See also Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale L.J. 1493, 1521-23 (1988) 
(interpreting Ackerman's dualism as a form of authoritarianism); Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Partial Constitution 370 n.21 (Harv. U. Press, 1993) (suggesting that Ackerman's theory is 
formalist). 
60. David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of Arti-
cle V, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1990). 
61. Klarman, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 766 (cited in note 49). 
62. See supra text accompanying note 20. 
63. Ackerman, We the People at 14 (cited in note 2). For Ackerman's argument for 
a "regime perspective," or for conceiving our constitutional history in terms of three re-
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voice of the People has duly spoken. Rather, he states that it 
would amount to a "repeal of dualist democracy itself. "64 That is, 
the latter amendment would go beyond the former's deep trans-
formation within dualist democracy to a repeal of that order. It 
might amount to a constitutional breakdown or revolution, ush-
ering in a new constitutional order altogether.6s 
The implication is that Ackerman himself acknowledges that 
principles such as liberty of conscience and freedom of speech, 
even if they are not explicitly entrenched in our constitutional 
document, are nonetheless fundamental rights that partly consti-
tute the identity of regimes within our constitutional order or of 
that order itself. Indeed, on Ackerman's account, freedom of 
speech, at least as expressed in participation in the amending 
process, might be unalienable.66 My claim is not that Ackerman 
here commits himself to a theory that the Constitution implicitly 
entrenches constitutive principles or fundamental rights outside 
Article V -only that his theory is not as far from such a concep-
tion as might appear on first sight. 
This suggestion brings me to the third point: Just as Acker-
man has elaborated a theory of "structural amendments" to the 
Constitution outside the formal Article V amending proce-
dures,67 so one might develop a theory of "structural entrench-
ments" of fundamental rights or constitutive principles outside 
Article V. Ackerman rejects rights foundationalist theories that 
hold that certain fundamental rights are pre-constitutional princi-
ples that bind even constitutional framers and ratifiers at the 
gimes or republics (those inaugurated by the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New 
Deal), see id. at 58-67. 
64. ld. at 15-16 n. Ackerman's implicit distinction between "deep transformations" 
within dualist democracy and a "repeal of dualist democracy itself" bears a resemblance 
to Murphy's distinction between amending a constitutional order (correcting, adjusting, 
or modifying it) and repudiating it (destroying it and creating another one). See, e.g., 
Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy at 14 (cited in note 8); Murphy, 
53 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 757 (cited in note 26). The Supreme Court of California, drawing a 
distinction between "amendment" and "revision," struck down a state constitutional 
amendment, adopted by referendum, that would have required state judges, when inter-
preting the state constitution, to follow the United States Supreme Court's interpretations 
of similarly worded clauses in the national constitutional document. See Murphy, Mer-
lin's Memory (cited in note 26) (discussing Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 
1990)). The Court reasoned that such a change "would so fundamentally transform Cali-
fornia's status as a member of a federal union as to effect a constitutional revision; and 
the [constitutional] text provided that 'revisions' could be accomplished only by special 
conventions." ld. 
65. See infra text accompanying note 71. 
66. See Ackerman, We the People at 15-16 n. (cited in note 2); see also supra note 33 
(citing arguments that the American Constitution entrenches certain unalienable rights 
against repeal). 
67. See supra text accompanying note 57. 
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founding, when they are establishing a constitutional order.68 
Whatever one thinks of such theories, one might advance a the-
ory that certain constitutive principles or fundamental rights be-
come entrenched against repeal through long and successful 
constitutional tradition and practice.69 Responding to Acker-
man's hypothetical Christianity amendments along these lines, 
Rawls suggests that our constitutional tradition and practice over 
two centuries place restrictions upon the formal amending proce-
dures of Article V.7o On this view, Ackerman's hypotheticals, 
instead of being valid amendments of the Constitution, would 
amount to a constitutional breakdown, or revolution in the 
proper sense.7t Moreover, this view entails that entrenchment is 
not purely positivist and confined to Article V (any more than 
amendment is for Ackerman's theory).n 
The possibility of a theory of this sort underscores an evi-
dent incongruity in Ackerman's theory: Ackerman supplements 
Article V where structural amendments are concerned but would 
invoke Article V as a positivist bar to structural entrenchments 
of fundamental rights at the founding or through constitutional 
tradition and practice.73 I do not claim that a theory of structural 
entrenchments would permanently fix basic constitutional guar-
antees, or perpetually impose pre-constitutional principles upon 
We the People. In fact, structurally entrenched fundamental 
rights or constitutive principles, like explicitly entrenched ones, 
will give way to a strong majority that is determined to make the 
Constitution conform to its political will. But again, this is simply 
a fact about political power as such,74 not a fact that unveils an 
ultimate rule of recognition or source of legitimacy in popular 
68. See Ackerman, We the People at 11-13 (cited in note 2). For the idea of "pre-
constitutional principles" that bind even framers and ratifiers, see Finn, Constitutions in 
Crisis at 7, 186, 188 (cited in note 11). 
69. Let us say "moderately successful," so as not to seem Panglossian about our 
constitutional tradition and practice, which have been marred by many injustices. 
70. Rawls, Political Liberalism at 238-39 (cited in note 25). See also Macedo, Lib-
eral Virtues at 182-83 (cited in note 55). 
71. Rawls, Political Liberalism at 239 (cited in note 25); Freeman, 21 Phil. & Pub. 
Aff. at 41-42 (cited in note 8). 
72. For arguments that neither amendment nor entrenchment is purely positivist 
and confined to the formal procedures of Article V, see, e.g., Amar, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 
457 (cited in note 33); Amar, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043 (cited in note 31). 
73. Ackerman presumably would deny that there is any real incongruity in this re-
spect. He might advance a ratchet theory concerning We the People, contending that it is 
one thing to expand popular sovereignty through a theory of amending the Constitution 
outside Article V, but quite another to contract it through a theory of entrenching the 
Constitution outside Article V. 
74. See Rawls, Political Liberalism at 233 (cited in note 25) (discussed supra text 
accompanying notes 25-26). 
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sovereignty in an imperfect American Constitution as distin-
guished from the (perhaps) more perfect German Basic Law. 
The question what is the Constitution-and when does it be-
come a different Constitution through breakdown or revolu-
tion-is analytically distinct from the question whether courts are 
empowered to declare amendments (or original provisions) un-
constitutionaf.7s And so, even if we decide to reject Ackerman's 
Article V positivism concerning entrenchment of constitutive 
principles or fundamental rights in the Constitution, there re-
mains his contrast between American and German judicial prac-
tices. He asserts that in America, judicial review invalidating 
"morally disastrous" amendments would seem "absurd" or "pre-
posterous" to "almost all lawyers," whereas in Germany it would 
not.76 From this contrast, Ackerman argues that our scheme of 
government is dualist, while the German scheme is rights 
foundationalist. 
Ackerman overstates the significance of this contrast. Ini-
tially, one might express doubts whether hypotheticals concern-
ing judicial review of unconstitutional amendments to our 
Constitution provide a good crucible in which to test whether al-
most all lawyers are dualists or rights foundationalists. After all, 
most American lawyers probably have never thought about the 
possibility of limitations on the amending power and, if asked 
about it, probably would simply make the immediate observation 
that the idea of an "unconstitutional constitutional amendment" 
seems like a contradiction in terms or a paradox. But this idea 
seems so only to those who beg the question by unreflectively 
assuming a false equivalence among the amending power, the 
Constitution, and the constituent power.77 If pressed beyond this 
75. For the distinction between theory of the Constitution and theory of judicial 
review (and between the interrogatives what is the Constitution and who may authorita-
tively interpret it), see, e.g., Murphy, Fleming, and Harris, American Constitutional Inter-
pretation 9-12 (cited in note 8); Sotirios A. Barber, On What the Constitution Means 196-
99 (Johns Hopkins U. Press. 1984); Sotirios A. Barber, The Constitution of Judicial Power 
40-43 (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1993). See also Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 9-
53 (Princeton U. Press, 1988). 
76. See Ackerman, We the People at 15, 15 n. (cited in note 2). See also supra text 
accompanying note 45. In referring to German judicial practice, Ackerman cites no cases 
but presumably is alluding to cases like The Southwest Case, 1 BVerfGE 14 (1951), and 
Privacy of Communications Case, 30 BVerfGE 1 (1970). These two cases are edited and 
translated in Murphy and Tanenhaus, Comparative Constitutional Law at 208-12, 659-66 
(cited in note 11). Murphy has observed that the Supreme Court in India has voided 
amendments, as has the Supreme Court of California. Murphy, Constitutions, Constitu-
tionalism, and Democracy at 11 & 23 nn.39-40 (cited in note 8). 
77. I cannot pursue these complex matters here. For sophisticated discussions of 
such issues, see, e.g., Harris, The Interpretable Constitution at 164-204 (cited in note 17); 
Barber, On What the Constitution Means at 199-202 (cited in note 75); Hart, The Concept 
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immediate reaction, almost all lawyers might also believe that to 
adopt amendments purporting to repeal certain unalienable fun-
damental rights (such as freedom of speech and liberty of con-
science) would be to repudiate our constitutional order, not 
merely to ratify a valid constitutional amendment.7s 
In any event, in assessing Ackerman's account of American 
judicial practice, we should distinguish between two types of situ-
ations in which an assertion regarding judicial review might be 
dismissed as absurd or preposterous. In the first, judicial review 
would seem absurd because it is unprecedented (or novel). In 
the second, it would seem absurd because it is contrary to well 
established precedents (or settled). To illustrate the first situa-
tion: in 1946, Justice Frankfurter might have said that representa-
tion-reinforcing judicial review of malapportioned legislatures 
would be absurd;79 or in 1922, a country lawyer named Hugo 
Black might have lamented that "absolutist" judicial review en-
forcing the Ftrst Amendment against both the state and federal 
governments would be absurd;so or again, in 1937, Ackerman's 
forebears might have despaired that President Franklin 
Roosevelt was launching a court-packing plan instead of seizing a 
crucial moment to amend the Constitution through the formal 
procedures of Article V, because the idea of structural amend-
ments to the Constitution outside Article V would be preposter-
ous.st To illustrate the second situation: today, one might argue, 
despite Richard Epstein, that judicial review invalidating the 
New Deal and the welfare state that has grown up on its founda-
tions would be absurd.82 
Which of these two types of situations does Ackerman mean 
to invoke in claiming that in America judicial review declaring 
amendments unconstitutional would seem absurd or preposter-
of Law at 144·50 (cited in note 18); H.L.A. Hart, Self-referring Laws, in H.L.A. Hart, 
Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 170 (cited in note 34). 
78. For a distinction between amending a constitutional order and repudiating it, see 
supra note 64. 
79. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (arguing that courts ought to 
stay out of that "political thicket"). By "representation-reinforcing" judicial review, I 
refer to the type of theory epitomized by John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A 
Theory of Judicial Review (Harv. U. Press, 1980) ("Democracy and Distrust"). 
80. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of 
Livelihood, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1103, 1116 (1986). 
81. For Ackerman's discussion of FDR's choices between launching a court-packing 
plan and fighting for constitutional amendments through the formal procedures of Article 
V, see Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations, Chapter 14 ("Court-Packing 
and Its Aftermath") (Fall 1993 draft, presented at New York University School of Law 
Colloquium on Constitutional Theory, Nov. 16, 1993). . 
82. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Emment 
Domain (Harv. U. Press, 1985). 
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ous to almost all lawyers? Evidently the first rather than the sec-
ond. Ackerman does not appear to argue that in America there 
is a well established practice against judicial review of amend-
ments to assure conformity with constitutive principles, only that 
there is no well established practice in favor of such review.s3 To 
be sure, there are cases rejecting the idea that a duly ratified 
amendment might be unconstitutional (which Ackerman does 
not cite ).84 But those cases were easy. For example, one basi-
cally upheld the Eighteenth Amendment against an argument 
that it was beyond the Article V amending power to prohibit the 
manufacture, sale, transportation, importation, and exportation 
of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes.ss Another essen-
tially upheld the Nineteenth Amendment against a contention 
that it deprived unconsenting states of their sovereign power to 
deny women the right to vote and thereby destroyed their auton-
omy as political bodies.s6 Furthermore, such cases date from an 
era-1920 and 1922, respectively-in which "representation-
reinforcing" review of ordinary lawmaking might have seemed 
hardly less absurd than "sovereignty-reinforcing" review of 
higher lawmaking.87 I mention these complex matters not to re-
solve them but rather to suggest that our practices regarding judi-
cial review may not be as settled as Ackerman's argument 
presumes. 
Put another way, the question whether the Supreme Court 
has authority to declare amendments (or original provisions) un-
constitutional presents a case of what Hart would call uncertainty 
in the penumbra of the ultimate rules of recognition.ss In resolv-
83. Indeed, Ackerman rejects a common interpretation of Coleman v. Miller, 307 
U.S. 433 (1939), which some scholars read as precluding judicial review of the amending 
process on the ground that such matters are nonjusticiable political questions. See Acker-
man, 99 Yale L.J. at 492-99 (cited in note 13). He argues that Coleman expressly repudi-
ates the formalist view that "all constitutional change must be governed in strict accord 
with the rules of Article Five." Id. at 492. 
84. The cases are discussed in Harris, The Interpretable Constitution at 187-201 
(cited in note 17). 
85. National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920). See also United States v. 
Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931). 
86. Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922). 
87. For the idea of "sovereignty-reinforcing" judicial review of amendments to the 
Constitution, by analogy to Ely's notion of "representation-reinforcing" judicial review of 
legislation and administration, see Harris, The Interpretable Constitution at 195 (cited in 
note 17) (referring to Ely, Democracy and Distrust (cited in note 79)). I am aware that 
footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), 
cites precedents from the 1920's (and 1930's) for what we now would call "representation-
reinforcing" judicial review. But it took Justice Stone's footnote to pull together and 
systematize these precedents into the intimations of such an approach, and only later 
were these precedents fully comprehended as applying (or anticipating) it. 
88. See Hart, The Concept of Law at 144-50 (cited in note 18). 
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ing such questions, as Hart aptly put it: "Here all that succeeds is 
success. . . . Here power acquires authority ex post facto from 
success. "s9 
In this light, the glaring difficulty with the idea of judicial 
review preserving the constitutive principles or fundamental 
rights of our Constitution against repeal is not so much absurdity 
or preposterousness as it is probable futility. We all know the 
standard moves concerning the impotence of the "least danger-
ous branch": for example, quotations from The Federalist No. 
78,90 President Andrew Jackson,91 James Bradley Thayer,92 Judge 
Learned Hand,93 and John Hart Ely.94 Yet we all also know the 
common countermoves: for example, hypotheticals about the 
possibility of judicial civil disobedience9s and the observation 
that, our fears of futility notwithstanding, after ordered to do so 
89. ld. at 149, 150. 
90. In describing the judiciary as the branch of government that is "the least danger-
ous to the political rights of the Constitution," Alexander Hamilton wrote: "It may truly 
be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment; and must ultimately 
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments." The 
Federalist No. 78 at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (cited in note 1). 
91. In response to Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), in which the 
Supreme Court per Chief Justice Marshall held that Georgia's anti-Cherokee laws were 
unconstitutional, President Jackson supposedly said: "Well, John Marshall has made his 
decision, now let him enforce it!" EdwardS. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 64 
(New York U. Press, 4th ed., 1957). This legend, however, has been disputed. ld. at 350-
51 n.61. 
92. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu-
tional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 156 (1893) ("Under no system can the power of courts go 
far to save a people from ruin; our chief protection lies elsewhere"). For a new interpre-
tation of this passage from Thayer, see Mark Thshnet, Thayer's Target: Judicial Review or 
Democracy?, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 9 (1993). 
93. Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty, in Irving Dilliard ed., The Spirit of Liberty 
189, 190 (Alfred A. Knopf, 3d ed., 1960) ("Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; 
when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it .... While it lies there it 
needs no constitution, no law, no court to save it"). 
94. Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 107 (cited in note 79) ("courts will tend to be 
swept along by the same sorts of fears" that moved legislatures, executives, and, for that 
matter, citizens). The fear of "futility" thesis often goes hand in hand with the fear of 
"destruction" thesis. See id. at 47-48. For another contemporary version of the "futility" 
thesis, see Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social 
Change? (U. of Chi. Press, 1991). 
95. Any calls for judicial civil disobedience must come to terms with the fact that 
abolitionist judges yielded to unjust positive laws supporting slavery. See Robert Cover, 
Justice Accused· Antislavery and the Judicial Process (Yale U. Press, 1975); Ronald Dwor-
kin, The Law of the Slave-Catchers, Times (London) Literary Supplement, Dec. 5, 1975, at 
1437 (reviewing Cover, supra). See also Barber, On What the Constitution Means 199-202 
(cited in note 75); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dred Again: Originalism's Forgotten Past, 10 
Const. Comm. 37 (1993); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Note, Justice Story, Slavery, and the 
Natural Law Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 273 (1988). 
1994] AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 377 
in United States v. Nixon,96 President Richard Nixon did turn 
over those tapes.97 
To Ackerman's dualist claims about the absurdity or prepos-
terousness of judicial review of morally disastrous amendments, 
and to fears about its futility, I offer three responses. The first is 
to repeat what Hart said concerning such situations: "Here all 
that succeeds is success."9s The second is to imagine what Yogi 
Berra, paraphrasing Hart, might have said: "Here nothing suc-
ceeds like failure." By that paradoxical utterance, I mean to sug-
gest the possibility that judicial review (or judicial civil 
disobedience) invalidating repeals of liberty of conscience and 
freedom of speech-whether successful or futile in a narrow 
legal sense-would succeed in dramatically signaling that a con-
stitutional breakdown or revolution was occurring.99 
My final response is to admit that-from a larger perspec-
tive outside our constitutional enterprise-constitutions, consti-
tutional interpretation, and judicial review are themselves 
preposterous and absurd. As William F. Harris expresses it: 
"American constitutional interpretation takes for granted the el-
emental preposterousness of its subject-the presumption that a 
political world can be constructed and controlled with words."too 
And, in the face of a determined political will, constitutions-
written or unwritten, with or without entrenchment clauses-
may be "absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a 
power in its own nature illimitable."wt We should not, however, 
adopt such an external point of view in assessing the foundations 
of legitimacy in our constitutional order.toz Our Constitution is 
96. 418 u.s. 683 (1974). 
97. See John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam 
and Its Aftermath 56 (Princeton U. Press, 1993). Ely also states: "That the president will 
disobey an order of the Supreme Court seems less likely in 1993 than it might have 100 
years ago." Id. Our long and moderately successful constitutional tradition and practice 
are what makes it seem less likely today. See supra text accompanying note 69. 
98. Hart, The Concept of Law at 149 (cited in note 18). 
99. Cf. Ackerman, We the People at 272-80 (cited in note 2) (discussing signaling 
concerning higher lawmaking in constitutional moments). 
100. Harris, The Interpretable Constitution at I (cited in note 17). Harris explains 
that he means the word "preposterousness" in "both its original and derived senses: (a) 
inverted in time, the 'later' coming before, and the 'before' coming later, and (b) 'con-
trary to nature, reason, or common sense.' " Id. at 1 n.l. 
101. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (discussed supra text 
accompanying note 24). 
102. I mean to echo Hart's notion of an "external" versus an "internal" point of view 
toward a legal system. See, e.g., Hart, The Concept of Law 86-88, 99-100, 112, 114 (cited 
in note 18). 
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underwritten by more than the fact of political power lying under 
an imperfect dualist Constitution.toJ 
IV. WE THE EXCEPTIONAL AMERICAN PEOPLE? 
The bicentennial celebration of the ratification of the Bill of 
Rights is over. James Madison rightly proclaimed in The Federal-
ist No. 14: "[The People of America] reared the fabrics of gov-
ernments which have no model on the face of the globe."t04 Two 
centuries later, though, these fabrics of governments have served 
as models for other countries (and will continue to do so if efforts 
like Ackerman's project of American imperialism, or exporting 
liberal revolution to the countries of Eastern Europe, make any 
headway).tos Ironically, the upshot of Ackerman's project of 
"American exceptionalism" is that on his view We the People, 
the American popular sovereign, are ultimately quite similar to 
the "legally untrammelled will" of the sovereign that is envi-
sioned in British legal positivism and that positivist dualists 
would find standing behind the entrenchment clauses of the pur-
portedly rights foundationalist German Basic Law.106 The 
American constitutional order may well be exceptional, but Ack-
erman has not established his case for dualism over rights 
foundationalism as the better account of the American scheme of 
government through his contrast between the American Consti-
tution and the German Basic Law. 
103. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27. 
104. The Federalist No. 14 at 104 (James Madison) (cited in note 1). 
105. See Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution (cited in note 5). Ackerman 
also considers "the meaning of 1989" and the revolutions of Eastern Europe for South 
Africa and Latin America, not to mention the United States. ld. at 113-23. 
106. See supra text accompanying notes 18-27. 
